Author: Adam Gurri
A Short Dialogue on Reductionism
Dialogue on Utilitarianism
Decorum
Decorum (L. “propriety”) – To prepon.
As a rhetorical concept, the idea advanced in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and developed by Cicero, Quintilian and others, that style should suit subject, audience, speaker and occasion. No idea was more carefully worked out in rhetorical theory nor more universally acclaimed; everyone writing about rhetoric touches on it in one way or another. And from Horace – really from Aristotle – onward it forms a major theme of literary criticism as well. (For a detailed discussion and list of citations, see D’Alton, Roman Literary Theory and Criticism, pp. 116ff.)
In spite of its obviousness, and venerability, the idea of decorum could use some rethinking. We might notice, for example, that decorum as a stylistic criterion finally locates itself entirely in the beholder and not the speech or text. No textual pattern per se is decorous or not. The final criterion for excess, indecorum, is the stylistic self-consciousness induced by the text or social situation. We know decorum is present when we don’t notice it, and vice versa. Decorum is a gestalt established in the perceiving intelligence. Thus the need for it, and the criteria for it, can attain universal agreement and allegiance, and yet the concept itself remain without specifiable content.
The number of stylistic and behavioral variables such a judgment must take into account leave the rules which are said to inform it far behind. It becomes an intuitive judgment of the sort a modern phenomenologist might examine, dependent on deep patterns of what Michael Polanyi would call “tacit knowledge.” It thus becomes – and clearly was for classical education – not only a rhetorical criterion but a general test of basic acculturation. To know how to establish the “decorum” of a particular occasion meant that you had, as a child or a foreigner might, learned to find your footing in that culture. I’ve taken the phrase “find your footing” from Clifford Geertz, a cultural anthropologist who locates the center of anthropology in something not too different from classical decorum.
From the perspective of postmodern thought, one can also see more clearly that decorum is a creative as well as a pious concept, that it creates the social reality which it reflects. Decorum, not to put too fine an edge on it, amounts to a pious fraud, the “social trick” par excellence. We create, with maximum self-consciousness and according to precise rules, an intricate structure of stylistic forces balanced carefully as to perceiver and perceived, and then agree to forget that we have created it and to pretend that it is nature itself we are engaging with. Rhetorical theory has spent endless time discussing how to adjust utterance to this preexistent social reality without reflecting on how that reality has been constituted by the idea of decorum. Like the human visual system, rhetorical decorum is a bag of tricks which constitutes for us a world that it then presents as “just out there” awaiting our passive reception.
Further, one might even think of decorum as the origin of, and basis for, what we usually call “common sense” or “reasonability.” Richard Harvey Brown has “reformulated” reason along these lines in a brilliant essay, “Reason as Rhetorical: On Relations among Epistemology, Discourse, and Practice,” where he argues for a “reason” which seems to me isomorphic with the “decorum” of classical rhetoric.
With decorum, as so often in current thought, the basic ideas of classical rhetoric have found new life and further development in disciplines other than the study of formal rhetoric.
-Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms
Dialogue on the Metaphysics of Virtues
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@VirtueSophist I read “Use of Knowledge” and I’m about halfway through Rationalism in Politics. It’s gotten to be a bit of a slog.
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@PyrrhicRational You’ve already read most of what’s relevant to our previous conversation.
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@PyrrhicRational Though definitely do not skip “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind.”
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@VirtueSophist His discussion of Hobbes seems endless and at odds with what he says in the earlier essays.
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@PyrrhicRational He’s odd, but you needn’t exhaustively survey of his peculiar way of looking at things to mine some very useful ideas.
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@VirtueSophist Such as his notion that politics and morals are contingent to a particular tradition and particular context.
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@PyrrhicRational Indeed. His is a traditionalist, and emphasizes case-by-case reasoning.
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@VirtueSophist What are “intimations”? He loves that word and I have no idea what the hell he is talking about.
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@PyrrhicRational The cricket example (even for those of us non-cricket players) is the most instructive, I think.
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@PyrrhicRational He speaks of two people making arguments for changing a rule or keeping it the same based on the evolution of how cricket
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@PyrrhicRational has been played. Arguments in court making reference to prior court decisions are similar; attempting to place a question
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@PyrrhicRational in its proper context in order to search for hints of what its answer might be.
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@VirtueSophist So traditions provide the context, and from it we divine hints about right action, right politics, right…sports rules?
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@PyrrhicRational You put it better and more succinctly than I could. Of course, the sports rules are the most important of the bunch.
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@VirtueSophist Forget morality and policy, at last we have a philosophy that keeps football from falling into nihilism!
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@PyrrhicRational This may be the first truly useful thing that philosophy has contributed to the world.
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@PyrrhicRational About the rules of football?
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@VirtueSophist About this line of thinking. It seems to me that you can simply use tradition to justify anything you already wanted to think
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@VirtueSophist it’s a grab back of justifications in the air that provide nothing truly concrete.
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@PyrrhicRational I think you will find in practice that disagreement is excessively narrow, and that conversational communities
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@PyrrhicRational (here’s why you’ll want to read “The Voice of Poetry”) fall into patterns that are not so arbitrary as you’re implying.
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@VirtueSophist Oakeshott discusses the conversation thing a bit in his essay on political education.
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@PyrrhicRational Oh, splendid! I admit it has been a long time, and I couldn’t remember just how much he discussed it in that volume.
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@VirtueSophist I still come to “so what?” Using a few similar rules, one can generate beautiful fractal patterns. But who cares?
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@VirtueSophist Similarly, sure, conversational communities fall into certain patterns. Our thoughts become bounded by the traditions,
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@VirtueSophist we are embedded within. So what? Why should I care? How can that possibly make any moral philosophy, or any life, meaningful?
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@PyrrhicRational When we met, you mentioned that you had gone through a Hume phase.
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@VirtueSophist Yes. One of history’s greatest skeptics.
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@PyrrhicRational He was also one of history’s great moral philosophers.
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@VirtueSophist I wasn’t as interested in that side of Hume, I’ll admit.
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@PyrrhicRational Unlike most moral philosophers, Hume was interested in describing morality than creating a system to inform our choices.
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@PyrrhicRational At the heart of his theory of how it all worked was what he called sympathy, or what we would call empathy.
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@PyrrhicRational Our emotional connection to the people we observe in our lives.
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@VirtueSophist Your moral metaphysics rests on some biological grounds, then? Something like Pinker’s “Moral Instinct”?
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@PyrrhicRational As I have never had a religious epiphany and I find all mysticism exceedingly tedious, I find no other recourse
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@PyrrhicRational for understanding human beings than to look at them as biological creatures, yes.
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@VirtueSophist At least we agree there. But sorry, you were going somewhere with Hume?
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@PyrrhicRational Hume was still alive before the fall of virtues.
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@PyrrhicRational In his day, what we today call virtue ethics was the background assumption of any moral philosophy.
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@PyrrhicRational So in his system, fueled by fellow-feeling, he spoke of “natural virtues” that are intrinsic, and “artificial virtues”.
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@PyrrhicRational The latter are what you and I and Oakeshott would say are conventional, or tradition based virtues.
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@VirtueSophist I’ve read distinctions like this in many places.
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@PyrrhicRational Indeed, they are practically as old as philosophy itself.
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@VirtueSophist I’ve always found them to be slippery.
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@VirtueSophist Usually the philosopher defines as “natural” that which he approves of, and “artificial” that which he wishes to critique.
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@PyrrhicRational I agree, and I’m not so sure that an actual division exists. I think we probably have instinctive reactions to seeing
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@PyrrhicRational someone do violence against another person without any context, or someone abusing a child, or something.
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@PyrrhicRational But otherwise I tend to think the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” virtues
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@PyrrhicRational is sometimes a useful thought experiment but not a true description.
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@VirtueSophist That all sounds fairly plausible, I suppose.
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@PyrrhicRational But Hume wasn’t “for” the natural or artificial virtues particularly; again his goals were descriptive.
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@PyrrhicRational Both natural and artificial virtues are valid parts of human morality, in his view.
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@PyrrhicRational As a fairly conservative fellow who favored stability, he was partial to the artificial virtues that promoted it.
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@VirtueSophist Seems like we’re getting to a pretty instrumental notion of virtue here.
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@PyrrhicRational Hume can certainly be read that way, but I don’t agree with him on that point.
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@PyrrhicRational I’m closer to his student, Adam Smith, who was both a moral scientist and a moral philosopher, proper.
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@VirtueSophist So what’s the bottom line here?
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@VirtueSophist You’ve given me a biological and tradition-based description of what morality is. Again I ask: so what?
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@PyrrhicRational To thine own self be true, young rationalist. We are feeling, moral creatures. We care what happens to the people around us
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@PyrrhicRational As Smith put it, we want not only to be loved, but the be lovely—we want to be praised, AND to be worthy of praise.
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@PyrrhicRational We have many cravings after meaning, and dignity, and reaching for something higher,
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@PyrrhicRational that cannot be reduced to something cynical and ugly.
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@PyrrhicRational Indeed your own grasping after meaning and a reason to care is a perfect example!
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@VirtueSophist what about sociopaths, or people who fall short of whatever ideal you’re proposing?
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@PyrrhicRational Justice takes many forms in many places, but people usually have ways of responding to someone who is genuinely horrible.
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@VirtueSophist I just don’t understand what virtue ethics, which makes some highly specific claims, has to do with any if this.
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@PyrrhicRational the system of virtues that was first introduced in Western thought by the ancient Greeks and
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@PyrrhicRational was built on for thousands of years is very powerful and very clarifying. I don’t know why that is.
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@PyrrhicRational It’s a question I’ve thought a lot about but can’t give you a definitive answer.
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@PyrrhicRational I can tell you that the rationalist projects of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries
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@PyrrhicRational which came after the rejection of this system have been utter failures.
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@PyrrhicRational I can also tell you that once you have internalized this system you see that people are grasping at little pieces of it.
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@PyrrhicRational Even after virtue, and even within rationalist projects. Anscombe is good on this subject; see “Modern Moral Philosophy”.
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@VirtueSophist As usual, you give me plenty of food for thought. I’m not convinced.
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@VirtueSophist But your weird, postmodernist-type traditionalism plus totally traditional virtue theory does intrigue me.
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@PyrrhicRational I try to be at least intriguing, perhaps even puzzling.
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@VirtueSophist I’m going to settle down with Oakeshott and see how I feel at the end of the volume. Take care.
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